Senator the
Honourable David Johnston
Minister for
Defence
Dear Senator Johnston
My letter concerns future acquisition of the Joint Strike
Fighter.
The recent fire in the engine of a Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF) highlights the risk that Australia
on your watch could be left without an operational air combat capability in the
JSF fleet should similar incidents occur in the future. The malfeasance
inherent in “concurrency” whereby aircraft are tested and manufactured at the
same time leaves our future fleet vulnerable to being grounded for a currently
‘unknown unknown’ problem. This would be a national security embarrassment
greater than having the entire Collins submarine fleet in for repairs at the
same time. If you doubt this I suggest obtaining an independent (non-Defence
Department) review of the inherent risks in the JSF project.
I write to suggest a practical and face-saving way out of what
has become the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) dilemma. The dilemma consists of the
following:
1. The
JSF is a proven failure, already obsolete, with well documented fundamental
design flaws that cannot be remedied by future upgrades.
2. Defence
has never compared JSF combat performance point by point with reference threats
out to 2030. Such analysis as has been done found that the JSF was massacred in
any ‘hot war’ scenario and locked out of contested airspace by modern IADS.[1]
3. Over
ten years senior defence bureaucrats and former defence ministers from both
sides of politics have wedded themselves to the project to the extent that they
are now in a classic ‘prisoner’s dilemma’.
5. Australia
has already committed to the delivery of 14 JSF units.
7. Having
retired the F-111 Australia is now without an effective air combat capability.
So let’s look at what we have.
The Superhornet is optimised as a reliable medium sized bomb
truck with self-defence and EW capability, but not as an air dominance fighter.
As a naval aircraft it carries the tomahawk anti shipping missile. Used as a
naval strike asset the Superhornet can assist the RAN in sea defence. Used in
the close air support role it may plug a big gap left by our lack of armour and
mobile artillery. The Superhornet could and should be tasked primarily to these
roles.
The JSF is a networking platform with limited stealth. Our
best hope is that the JSF will deliver on the promise to be a capable
networking platform. In this role 14 JSF may be valuable force-multipliers as
‘eyes in the sky’ along with Wedgetail. The investment in 14 JSF is therefore
best leveraged by networking them with a capable air-to-air platform. In this
model they are protected by air dominance fighters but assist the same by
enhancing their situational awareness.
The task of chasing and shooting down evolved Sukhois, the
Chinese J-20 or the Russian PAK-FA demands a top end high performance combat
aircraft – which takes us back to where this all began when the AIR6000 project
cancelled was and no comparison of available aircraft allowed. This the JSF
cannot do for reasons inherent in the design - too small, too heavy, too
tightly packed, too slow, only four missiles in stealth mode, can’t turn, can’t
climb, can’t run, and these problems cannot be overcome by future upgrades. I
refer you to the literature.
In this manner Australia
can have a diversified, flexible and affordable RAAF combat capability that:
·
honours our existing commitments;
·
maximises the utility of existing platforms;
·
plugs gaps in our land force inventory; and
·
provides air-to-air combat capability which the
JSF alone cannot provide.
This model replicated the highly successful USAF model in
which types of specialist aircraft were combined in ‘packages’. While
conventional wisdom now favours a single aircraft type this leaves defence
highly vulnerable if problems develop. I note that the entire F-22 fleet and
the entire JSF fleet have been grounded in recent years. Australia
successfully fielded both the FA-18 and the F-111, and now intends to field the
Superhornet and the JSF. The addition of an air dominance fighter to this mix
is now the only viable way forward.
I therefore request that you raise with you cabinet
colleagues the option of acquiring an air dominance fighter in preference to
purchasing more JSF.
I further request that you discuss with operational
commanders options to best utilise current and future aircraft inventories in
combat.
I also request that you engage non Department of Defence
experts in a genuine assessment of risks inherent in the JSF program and what
that may mean for Australia ’s
future defence.
This letter does not require a written response. However please
note that I have studied this issue in depth over 10 years and written
extensively on it. Please therefore spare yourself the indignity and me the
tedium of including any of the following in any response:
·
a ‘cut and paste’ statement from the Lockheed Martin
publicity office e.g. ‘unrivalled fifth generation capability…sensor
fusion…unparalleled situational awareness…let the missiles do the turning...bla
bla;
·
a statement expressing confidence in the project
without reference to anything real;
·
a statement to the effect that because the
Americans have confidence in the program (they don’t) it must therefore
magically be able to shoot down Russian and Chinese stealth fighters (it can’t);
·
a statement to the effect that because a number of
northern hemisphere nations have bought into the program it must be right for Australia
(this is contrary to analysis); or
·
a statement to the effect that the program is
too big to fail so it must be OK.
Yours sincerely
Erik Peacock
[1]
See analysis by Dr John Stillion of Rand Corp, Air Power Australia ,
and Eagle Vision Ltd. See also the leak to Vanity
Fair, and reports to US
Congress.
[2]
Cost is defined as ‘what you pay for the capability you get over the life of
the aircraft’ and includes training, tooling, parts, maintenance, weapons,
fuel, changes to facilities and basing, simulators etc. The true cost likely to
be well over AUS$30 billion.
[3]
I refer to Air Power Australia
analysis since no other analysis was undertaken.