Why Environmentalists Should Care about Defence

 

So why have I just posted five articles on Australia’s vulnerability to invasion on a left leaning environmentalist blog? The answer quite simply, is that you can only protect what you can defend; be it the environment, human rights, or any other value.

 



 

On the rare occasions that environmentalists talk about Defence it is usually in an eye rolling ‘I can’t believe they spend so much money on this stuff for no reason’ kind of way. This is usually followed by concerns over disposal of toxic stuff (aircraft fuel, depleted uranium rounds, spent nuclear rods etc), the effects of sonar on whales, and sometimes a grudging aside that the military can be helpful in disaster relief because they have lots of helicopters…and that’s about it. This was, more or less, the response I got from Christine Milne when I spoke to her recently at a celebration of the World Heritage Area extension, (that’s the one Abbott wants to repeal, and which environmentalists have been fighting for since 1973). The Greens have a Defence Policy but it is really just a statement of principles and lacks any real substance.

Underlying this intellectual sloth is a kind of unspoken assumption that if we (rich Western people) were nicer to the rest of the world wars wouldn’t happen, so we wouldn’t need to worry about defence. Didn’t work so well for the Celts when the Romans showed up, or too well for the Romans when the Goths showed up but hey…. After spending five years trying to even talk to any Green politician about Defence without success I have given up.

With all respect to the eco-anarchists, if you want national parks, marine reserves, restrictions on extractive activity etc, you need a nation state that is able and willing to enforce those restrictions. It really doesn’t matter how many marine reserves Australia declares in the Coral Sea, if there is no naval presence, international fishing interests will just keep fishing.

War is indeed unhealthy for children and other living things but war is a fact. In 1985 an Indonesian official bluntly asked Kim Beazley what Australia would do if Indonesia invaded Papua New Guinea. Beazley to his credit said that we would fight to the last man. A key reason why Indonesia did not invade PNG, and did not send its army against UN forces in Timor Leste, is because we had the F-111 bomber (that was so beloved of Beazley). Now we don’t and on current trends Australia will not be able to defend PNG in 2030. What of human rights? What of PNG’s super diverse environment? Why do the Greens and the Left generally oppose Australia having an offensive military capability? What exactly do they think will happen?

Facing no serious military threat to their existence most Western nations now see military matters in terms of policing, and coalition operations against developing nations. Australia does not have that luxury. It’s an uncomfortable and unacknowledged truth that the greatest threat to our natural treasures may not be global warming, but Javanese expansionism. Invasion is the ultimate form of privatisation. War is trade by other means.

So is there any real possibility that the Javanese empire (aka Indonesia) could extend their transmigration program to Australia, or as Indonesian generals prefer to call it “Iryan Selatan” or “South Iryan”? The future intentions of any nation, and the Javanese in-particular, are inscrutable. What the preceding five articles show is that, on current trends, invasion is possible. If we do not build a defence force that provides a reasonable power balance, we put at risk both ourselves and the smaller countries to our north and east. It’s time the Left and the Greens in-particular grew up, left the ideological sand-pit, and started dealing with the world as it really is.

Indonesian special forces with the bodies of the GAM guerrillas they killed. Photogaph taken near Nasi Besar Island in May 2003. While Australian politicians and Defence bureaucrats play their little games, the Indonesians play for real.

Tag line: Greens security policy, Christine Milne, Australian defence policy, pacifism, ABRI, TNI, transmigration, human rights Iryan Jaya, human rights Timor Leste, F-111 bomber, PNG security, Pacifc Rim security and strategic policy.

 

How Australia Lost the War of 2030 - Conclusion

 

Introduction

The previous three articles considered how Australia would fare in a war with Indonesia circa 2030 based on current trends. These articles found that Australia would be convincingly defeated in a high tempo conventional war based on known facts and reasonable projections.

 

Does nasty things to Joint Strike Fighters – the Indo/Russion PAK-FA

 

Despite the warnings of academics and subject matter experts Defence and a revolving door of Defence Ministers continue to live in a fantasy land. In this parallel reality the Joint Strike Fighter is a superlative combat aircraft that can defeat all future threats, the TNI is a primitive third world force – the kind that we defeated in Iraq but less equipped. Russia is still the enemy and Russian equipment is always inferior. The army is only really needed for low intensity conflicts in far-away places, not for national defence; and our real security lies in the US alliance. Indonesia is a future ally against China not a peer threat. None of these beliefs are true. However they have resulted in an acquisition path which will leave Australia unable to project force, defend its near neighbours or guarantee its national sovereignty. Further, that path is not fiscally sustainable so further inadequacies are inevitable.

 

A plane for pilots to die in – the Joint Strike Fighter

The Left of Australian society are even more disconnected from reality when it comes to defence issues. They see the strategic environment of the next three decades as essentially benign. A senior policy analyst for a central government agency once told me that if Australia spent more on foreign aid it wouldn’t need a military. While regional instability is sometimes acknowledged it is assumed that Australia’s role is to assist in policing or UN stabilisation missions, and to offer a home to the human overflow that washes up on our shores. The lessons of World War Two have been entirely forgotten.

 In this context Australian defence planning is exactly where it was in 1938. Then it was assumed that Asians were racially inferior, could never develop a military capability to defeat Western nations, and no one would dare to attack both the British Empire and American interests in the Pacific. Consequently Australia ignored the military rise of Japan and invested in irrelevant and out dated military capabilities. As a result we came close to being overrun.

 Today South East Asia is in the grip of an arms race, fuelled in part by the rise of China. This arms race is not a temporary shopping spree but a long term trend towards developing modern, balanced and supported military forces fielding world’s best equipment. The fact is that poor countries can develop formidable military capabilities very quickly. Australia has proven itself unable to do so, but continues to invest in irrelevant platforms like the Joint Strike Fighter while assuming that no one would ever threaten Western allies in the Pacific. This reveals an underlying racism in Defence’s attitude to regional capabilities. As a result we have a gold plated train wreck with potentially tragic consequences.

The scenario modelled in the previous articles is weighted heavily in Australia’s favour. In coming decades South East Asian nations will invest in top tier ISR capabilities including UAVs, and air borne early warning and control aircraft that are equivalent or superior to Australia’s Wedgetail. Cruise missiles will be standard inventory items, may be manufactured locally under licence, and may include stealth features. Existing Sukhoi customers such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam will in coming decades be flying the PAK-FA stealth fighter which comprehensively defeats every aircraft in the Western World except the F-22. China will be mass manufacturing a larger navalised stealth fighter bomber the J-20, which also comprehensively defeats every aircraft in the Western World except the F-22. As mentioned previously, the F-22 is out of production – shut down to release more funds for the Cuckoo in the defence funding nest – the Joint Strike Fighter.

 In the next post I consider an alternative path. This path provides Australia with an affordable, supportable, and balance military that can counterbalance the exponential growth in regional capabilities.

 

Tag line: Australian defence strategy, Joint Stike Fighter, TNI, ABRI, Sukhoi, PAK-FA, T-50, J-20, stealth aircraft, Pacific Rim defence, Defence White Paper

How Australia Lost the War of 2030 - Part 3

The Land War

In a previous article I speculated that global financial difficulties could impose severe hardship on poor countries that are not self-sufficient in food or fuel. This could, given the right circumstances, lead to war on our doorstep and even invasion.

While no one knows the future we can make real world predictions about how a conflict with our northern neighbour might play out based on the current known strategy and the military acquisition paths of both nations.  In the previous two articles I examined the air war and then the sea war. These articles found that Australia would lose convincingly in a conflict with the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) on current trends post 2030. This article considers the subsequent land war in this scenario.

Force the surrender of opposing ground forces

Let’s for a moment take air power out of the equation. Perhaps both sides have air parity, or perhaps Australia has invested in mobile surface to air missile systems that provide theatre air cover for the army (NB: there are no current plans to do so). How do the ground forces stack up?

Armour

The primary weapon of ground forces is the main battle tank. Australia has 59 second hand American Abrams main battle tanks. Due to budget constraints some have recently been put into storage. Indonesia has or will acquire between 100 and 200 ex NATO Leopard tanks of similar vintage. The two are roughly equivalent since both were designed to defeat Soviet armour. Either way, Australia is outnumbered close to 2:1 or 4:1. Without tanks, any other armour Australia has is irrelevant unless Australia were to invest in another tank killing platform such as the Italian light tank when it considers replacing the older ASLAVs. [Ed note: since this was written Indonesia has signed a contract with Germany for purchase of 103 Leopard tanks and associated equipment and has begun taking delivery. This is in addition to its existing inventory of light armour.]

Helicopters

Australia is currently taking delivery of a fleet of 22 'Tiger' helicopter gunships. These are significant force multipliers carrying two anti-tank missiles each in addition to rockets and cannon. Indonesia currently has no such capability but is on the market for helicopter gunships including the American Apache. That’s an interesting choice because the Apache is a dedicated tank killer designed from the outset to defeat massed attacks by Soviet armour. In other words, you only buy an Apache if you want to engage in nation state conflicts with countries that own main battle tanks. In the local context, that means Australia and Malaysia.

Note that helicopters are not survivable in a contested air environment and Australian helicopters would be easy prey to opposing combat aircraft including ground attack aircraft of which Indonesia intents to own 80 – 36 Hawker, 12 F5E, 16 Tucano and 16 Yak aircraft.

 

 

The Apache attack helicopter being sought by the TNI

Artillery

Australia has replaced its towed artillery but has put on-hold investment in modern mobile artillery/rocket systems. Indonesia is pressing ahead with modern investments in this area including the French Caesar system. The Caesar long range mobile artillery system being acquired by TNI. Australia has no equivalent. See further here

 

Infantry

Australia has 80,000 infantry including reserves. Reliable statistics for the TNI are difficult to come by but it appears Indonesia has around 470,000 soldiers of which at least 180,000 are ‘front line’ professional soldiers. Depending on how many troops can be moved and how many needs stay at home we get odds of between 2:1 and 5:1 which doesn’t sound particularly promising. Currently Australian infantry have better night vision and communications equipment but the TNI is developing better capabilities in this area and has only to equip a fifth of its infantry to match then outnumber, the ADF. Being numerically inferior is not a problem if you have superiority in tanks, armoured vehicles and aircraft. However if you only have parity then you have a serious problem. If you are overmatched, you lose.

 

TNI Marines in combat – Indonesia has a large professional army

Sustainability and supply chain

It is an open secret that the ADF lacks depth in sustainment. What that means is that we don’t have enough reserves of fuel, ammunition, spare parts, technically trained personal, and human infrastructure to sustain a high intensity conflict aka open war.

Rather we are trained and equipped for counter insurgency and coalition operations. We use stuff up and then replace it. Our capacity for sustained national defence against a determined aggressor with modern weapons is doubtful.

Australia is beginning to address this through investments to ‘network and harden’ our land forces. Essentially this is a rolling series of programs to replace and upgrade transport vehicles and communications equipment. If future governments continue to commit substantial funding to this process it will yield results in the 2020 - 2040 time frame but it won’t happen without bi-partisan support.

The TNI on the other hand has its own challenges. Logistically hundreds of vehicles and nearly half a million people are not easily coordinated, supplied, and moved over water. A very substantial naval transport infrastructure would have to be assembled. However Indonesia is developing its blue water capability including capacity for beach landings. A maritime nation with thousands of islands would be expected to do so. It is not cause for alarm but does require careful monitoring. Also, once a base was established on Australian soil the 64 Hercules transport aircraft Indonesia intends to buy could move a lot of kit very quickly. In all likelihood, if the TNI gained air superiority they would cross either the Timor Sea or, having first taken Papua New Guinea and established a forward base, cross the Coral Sea to the eastern side of Cape Tribulation North Queensland. They can ignore Darwin, bomb our northern bases, but move their land forces down the east coast of Australia, establishing military bases and supplying them by sea as they go.

 

Indonesian soldiers during combat operations in Ache. I once went shooting with guys like these at a target range in Ambon – about which you can read more in my book.

What Happens After ‘Ten’?

We started with the ten points of modern warfare. Number ten was “Disarm surrendered forces and send them home (or massacre them).”

There is no need to speculate about what would happen in Australia if the TNI were to take control. East Timor and Iryan Jaya provide real world examples. The TNI’s habit of ignoring Islamic violence against minorities within Indonesia should also provide a clue. I will spare the detail. It’s not hard to google.

This is not an alarmist post. Indonesia, like all nations, has a natural right to self-defence. From their perspective they have extremely well-armed neighbours to their West, a large and relatively lawless archipelago that harbours extremists to their north, there are separatist movements in Ache and Iryan Jaya, and they lost East Timor following an invasion by UN forces led by Australia. In addition Indonesia is the world’s most populous Islamic country. They are concerned by the rise of atheist China in Asia and by the US habit of invading Muslim countries on false pretexts without UN support. They have 13000 islands and hundreds of ethnic groups to manage. It is unsurprising that they are investing in a capacity for shore landings, submarines, a mobile professional army, and affordable combat aircraft.

What is needed in our region is a reasonable balance of forces. This can be done affordably and without offence by Australia if rational policy decisions are allowed to replace rent seeking within the Defence bureaucracy. This is the topic of my next and subsequent posts.

 

Tag line:  Australian army, TNI, Indonesian military capability, GAM Ache, network and harden ADF, Australian Abrams tanks, Australian defence policy, Australian and strategic defence policy.

Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Review of the Defence Annual Report 2010-2011

To the secretariat, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Review of the Defence Annual Report 2010-2011

Please find attached a submission to this review.  You will note that it takes the form of my previous submission to the Defence White Paper in 2008.  I present it here with comments in brackets to bring it up to date.  Tellingly, all the predictions made in that paper have come to pass and all the observations are still relevant.  Below are some points addressing specific issues that have progressed since 2008.  Accordingly I include this cover letter as part of the submission and ask that it be made viewable on the review website. 

In addition I refer the Committee to my previous submission to the JSCFADT inquiry into Australian Defence Force Regional Air Superiority available here: http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/adfair/subs/sub32.pdf

All the statements and observations in that submission are still true and relevant to the current review, excepting that the Joint Strike Fighter performance is now far less than I envisaged in 2006.  You may consider that submission to be part of this submission also.

Both these submissions heavily reference research by Air Power Australia.  I wish to stress that I do not represent Air Power Australia, nor do I have any factional interest in Defence matters.  My concern is solely the security of Australia and her near friends and allies in our arc of influence – PNG, Fiji, New Zealand et al.  I reference Air Power Australia (APA) analysis for the following reasons:

1. APA comprises career engineers, pilots and air power planners, and defence scientists, many of whom have invested their working lives in building Australia’s defence capability from the inside;
2. APA has no financial stake in the outcome of any acquisition program within Defence;
3. No one at APA has a career to protect within Defence;
4. APA is linked to a deep and extensive international network of air power experts;
5. APA analysis takes the form of peer reviewed scientific papers;
6. Taken in total this published material represents much of the analytical work that Defence should have done as a matter of course over ten years and failed to do, or actively supressed;
7. APA has done this work ex gratis and made it available to the world; and
8. APA has made the connections between an understanding of the physical capabilities of air power weapon systems (planes, SAMs, radar systems etc), tactical matters, and strategic policy.  I am not aware of any other open source that has attempted this with similar rigour.

Note that the commercial value of this work would be hard to estimate but Australia owes the APA community a considerable debt.

I have not referenced analysis by the Department of Defence for the following reasons:

1. I could not find any.
2. Public statements by Defence usually take the form of unsubstantiated claims and an appeal to secrecy.
3. In relation to the Joint Strike Fighter and related matters Defence ‘analysis’ often replicates verbatim public statements by the Lockheed Martin publicity office.
4. These statements are not adjusted to reflect known realities, for instance the Department still talks about “affordable stealth” in relation to the JSF.
5. The Department and Ministerial Offices continue to repeat known untruths some of which are addressed below.
6. Defence has never publicly, in closed session with any minister, or else-where, and with evidence, refuted any of the claims of APA that are in direct contradiction to statements by Defence.
7. Defence in their public pronouncements and through the Minister have not acknowledged the existence, let alone the profound strategic shift, brought about by the T-50 and J-20 Russian and Chinese stealth aircraft designs, proliferation of advanced SAM systems, counter stealth radars, or evolution of the Sukhoi design.

F-111 Capability and Availability

Since the attached submission was written the F-111 has been removed from active service and the Sole Operator Program closed.  This was in itself a travesty since at that time the Commonwealth Audit Office had stated that the airframe was safe for another 10,000 flying ours.  Independent testimony stated that with a virtually infinite supply of spare parts in the USA, the F-111 could be maintained almost indefinitely and evolved into a modern interceptor.  This would leverage the significant investment already made in the aircraft and pay significant dividends to Australian industry.  The F-111 represented a third of the strike capability provided by the RAAF.  There is no other aircraft that currently has the same capabilities apart from the Russian SU-34.  This matter deserves attention by the Committee since it goes to the heart of what drives decision making within the NACC program office.  It illustrates the cavalier approach taken to hugely expensive and profoundly important decisions by Defence, and says much about the profoundly dysfunctional imbroglio that air power planning (or non-planning) in Australia has become.

F-22 Capability and Availability

Defence has stated directly and through the Minister’s Office, and in correspondence to me, that the F-22 Raptor has never been available for export, that it is only suited to a niche role and that it is prohibitively expensive.  Further, the F-22 assembly line has closed and some sources have stated that it cannot be re-opened. All of these statements are false. 

An export version of the F-22, dubbed the F-22A, was offered for export to Australia in 2001.  The delegation from the USA was turned back at the airport on arrival in Australia because Defence had already decided on the JSF.  At that time the JSF was a concept program and the F-22 was a proven operational capability.  Defence did not examine the F-22 offer.

The F-22 carries guided DJAMs and operates as a multi-role fighter, bomber and interceptor. 

At the time the assembly line was closed the unit price of the F-22 was circa US$120M.  The final unit price of the JSF is now climbing above US$160M.  On both a unit procurement and cost for capability basis the F-22 is now the more affordable plane even if Australia pays the full cost of re-opening the F-22 assembly line.

The F-22 assembly line has been shut down following a massive and dishonest campaign.  One consequence of shutting down assembly is to increase unit cost of future aircraft and increase pressure Congress to buy the JSF since the better rival is out of production.  

Australia paid US$300M for an option to purchase the JSF.  US$300M is the estimated cost to re-start F-22 production.  It would make good sense in light of a looming A$50 billion JSF purchase to pay the cost of re-starting the F-22 production line and purchase new Raptors for the RAAF.  The manufacturer has photographed and documented every part of the production process in order to ensure that production can be re-started.  The reason for this is clear.  Once the fog of marketing propaganda and diplomatic arm twisting has dissipated that material reality will emerge that the US cannot remain relevant in the Pacific without the Raptor.  The JSF and Superhornet are simply not survivable.  When this reality becomes undeniable the F-22 program will be re-started.  It is a ‘when’ question not an ‘if’ question.  Export of the F-22 requires Congressional agreement to a formal request from Australia.  Such a request should have been made years ago and must now be made as a matter of urgency.

I also attach for the Committee’s review correspondence from (then) Air Commodore John Harvey in 2005 which includes the following statement:

“Defence has up to 40 DSTO scientists working full time on detailed technical analysis of the JSF and how it will perform when integrated into the future networked ADF.  In addition, RAAF pilots are involved in high fidelity simulation exercises to assess the capability of the JSF against advances (sic) threats – both from the air and from the ground – including threats that won’t be fielded for many years to come.  All this activity reinforces Defence’s view that the JSF, integrated into the future networked ADF, will provide the air combat capability that Australia needs well into the future.”

This statement reveals an astonishing level of intellectual vacuity that says much about the NACC program office.  Consider the following:

Defence has up to 40 DSTO scientists working full time on detailed technical analysis of the JSF….but none working on any comparison of other aircraft that might perform better against known reference threats.  Note that in 2005 the JSF was still a ‘paper plane’.

…and how it will perform when integrated into the future networked ADF.  Note: “when” not “if”.  So by 2005 Defence had already chosen the JSF. Why?  Why were 40 scientists studying a plane after it had already been selected?  What did they hope to discover?

In addition, RAAF pilots are involved in high fidelity simulation exercises to assess the capability of the JSF against advances (sic) threats ….this is true, and the simulations showed that the JSF was not survivable.  The following is a quote from one of the scientists working on the JSF simulations:

“My colleagues and I do simulations of future military conflict as consultants to international clients, and my colleagues and I have done detailed studies of the JSF F-35A vs Su-35S. The result is clear but stark: the F-35As are annihilated in each engagement. (Note: we did the same work inside Defence using classified data and got the same result—which the Senior Defence Officers noted (up to Chief of Defence Force level), did not challenge, and proceeded with the JSF purchase. So they know the truth.)”[i]

All this activity reinforces Defence’s view that the JSF, integrated into the future networked ADF, will provide the air combat capability that Australia needs well into the future.  So Defence is sees its own enthusiasm for the JSF as proof that it is the right aircraft.  That is the kind of institutionalised groupthink that one would expect to find in a religious cult, not in a professional organisation.

I also draw the Committee’s attention to the statement that the F-22 is three times more expensive than the JSF.  The F-22 is now the cheaper aircraft.

It was in an attempt to cut through this institutionalised irrationality that I spoke to then Defence Minister John Faulkner and presented him with a submission at a community Cabinet in 2009.  In essence I asked him why there was no contestability in the advice given him by Defence on any issue.  He made a personal commitment to me to establish an independent expert reference group to critique Departmental advice on air power issues.  Faulkner failed to do this.  Given that Defence and the NACC program office still refuses to engage with anyone who disagrees with them, including prominent experts within Defence and outside it, it is vitally important in the national interest to get contestability across the board, but most urgently with air power planning.

I can only urge the Committee in the strongest possible terms to make that a key recommendation of the current review.

Sincerely

Erik

Tag line: ABC Four Corners Joint Strike Fighter, JSF, Sukhoi, Defence Force Reform, RAAF, Lockheed Martin, Thana Marketing, F-22, stealth fighter, fighter aircraft, networking, Superhornet, air power, Australian defence force.

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[i] Wing Commander Chris Mills RAAF (Retd) BSc, MSc, CEO Eagle Vision, simulations representative at REPSIM Pty Ltd, pers comm.

Save the RAAF – it may save you

Sukhoi 35S - the reference threat that the Joint Strike Fighter has never been compared to.

 

Ever wanted to borrow thousands of dollars to buy a dud aeroplane?  Don’t worry, the government plans to do that on your behalf. 

This debate finally got some traction in the mainstream media with the recent ABC Four Corners program confronting the myths of affordability, performance, and supportability (http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/). This plane will cost upwards of US$35billion and it is already irrelevant and over matched in our region.

This isn't really news. Experts in the air power community have been saying it for years. This issue has taken up a lot of time at the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade in their review of the Annual Defence Report, and their earlier review of RAAF air superiority.  As usual, on the one hand the debate featured detailed technical analysis from acknowledged industry experts showing that the Joint Strike Fighter is a gold plated lemon.  On the other hand, the debate featured a series of motherhood statements, shifting goal posts, and appeals to secrecy, from the project proponents and their cheer squad in the Defence Department. Now proponents claim is has a "secret weapon". How convenient. No it doesn't, but it can destroy defence budgets and capabilities across the Western World. Really it is a very expensive form of disarmament.

Special thanks to Dr Dennis Jensen MP, committee member, for his balanced and insightful contribution to the report– and thus devastating critique of the project.  See here for the Committee’s report. 

It is common knowledge in the air power community that the JSF capability was analysed only against baseline late 1980’s/early 1990’s vintage Russian designs, not the modern air power environment of 2020-2030. Tellingly Defence and the project proponents refused point blank to reveal what the reference threats were that the JSF was analysed against. In other words, they refused to reveal the baseline data but demanded we accept their predictions on faith.

I feel that the Committee’s report misrepresents my submission somewhat, though doubtless only for the sake of brevity. It said that I advocating purchase of the F-22 but noted that the F-22 is not available for export.  In fact I spent some time explaining in my submission that the F-22 is available for export but only on request, and only by agreement of Congress.  Yes that is a tall bar.  No, Defence has never explored that option.  Yes, the F-22 was offered to Australia.  I have consistently argued that all alternatives should be explored.  The report also said that I argued for retention of the F-111 but noted that it has been retired from service.  Actually I noted that Defence dug holes and physically buried the F-111.  I included this to provide some history for the Committee on the ongoing attempts by Defence to destroy the RAAF as a war fighting machine and turn it into an expensive flying club – suitable only for counter insurgency operations and benign airpower environments like Afghanistan, oh – and rent seeking defence projects that fail to deliver.

Please read my submission and decide for yourself.  You will find it on the Committee website and their is another submission on this blog spot. You will find a great deal of material on the Air Power Australia website: www.ausairpower.net if you really want to get into the nuts and rivets. Check out Eric Palmer’s blog too.


Tag line: ABC Four Corners, Joint strike fighter, JSF, Lockheed Martin, sukhoi, raptor, F-22, Superhornet, Defence reform, RAAF, new air combat capability, air power, fighter aircraft, stealth fighter.

Australian Defence Force Reform and the RAAF

From 'Lost International Soldiers' photo collection. 

Debates about buying things for Defence to blow people up with tend to fall into two camps.  There is the “war is bad so we need to stop funding it, fighting for peace is like procreating for virginity, all wars are the fault if the West so if we spend more money on foreign aid we wouldn’t need a defence force because all the nice people over there wouldn’t come over here and invade” camp.  Then there is the “what the fig are smoking, international relations works by the law of the jungle, you only own what you can defend, there were lots of nice Germans in the 1930’s but WWII still happened, we need lots and lots of shiny new weapons to scare the bad guys with” camp.  Then there are lots of people who understand international relations and geo-strategic policy quite well but lack the technical knowledge to understand practical military things, such as why the Chinese J-20 stealth fighter/bomber/interceptor is a strategic game changer that eats the US Joint Strike Fighter for breakfast and has the Superhornet for desert.

Remember the Somme?  Lots of propaganda, lots of theory, not much empirical

analysis. There are a very small number of people who actually do real analysis – like Dr John Stillion of Rand Corp (at that time) who told them the truth about the Joint Strike Fighter – center piece of a defence ponzi scheme that is now threatening not just Western budgets, but Australia’s future existence as a nation.  The Australian Defence Force bureaucracy ignored him and every other analyst who didn’t sing along to the JSF song.  The fact is, if more people had understood what military technology meant for strategic policy WWII would not have happened.  The fact is, history is repeating. 

In subsequent posts I have added my submissions and correspondence and a number of opinion pieces based on research done over nearly a decade. See for example here:

http://findinghomebookspace.blogspot.com.au/2013/09/defence-force-pornography-meets-real.html

You will note that all my predictions have come to pass and none of the issues I raised were addressed. Read more analysis from ‘down under’ in the book and here:
 

http://elpdefensenews.blogspot.com.au/

http://www.ausairpower.net/